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Since the Civil War there have been but seven elected Democratic
presidents, nearly half of whom advanced from relative obscurity directly to
the White House. The first post-Civil war Democrat to run for and win the
presidency was Grover Cleveland, who was the mayor of Buffalo, New York,
at the time. Nearly a century later Jimmy Carter set out on his improbable
quest for the Oval Office as a former one-term governor of Georgia.
Between these two unlikely presidencies looms Woodrow Wilson, who
waited until he was fifty-three to place himself before any electorate, and
who, a scant two years later, had nearly completed his first term as the
Governor of New Jersey when he wrested the 1912 Democratic presidential
nomination from a small pack of better known rivals.
Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson...three gasping Democrats bobbing for
political breath in a sea littered with marauding Republicans. Take away the
thirty-six year New Deal interregnum between 1932 and 1968 and they are
the only bona fide post-Civil War Democratic presidents (save Andrew
Johnson who ran with Lincoln on the Union Party ticket in 1864). Cleveland,
Carter, and Wilson...three accidental presidents whose accidental
presidencies were not the result of presedential deaths.
Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson...three presidential aspirants who were
the direct beneficiaries of intra-Republican squabbling. Fights between
reformist Mugwumps and stand-pat Stalwarts helped elevate Mayor
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Cleveland. In 1976 the one-two punch of Watergate and the Ford-Reagan
fight proved slightly too much for the GOP to overcome. And in 1912
Wilson's victory was made possible by the titanic Roosevelt-Taft split.
Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson...three Democratic presidents whose
presidencies punctured eras of Republican dominance. And there the
similarity ends. After all, Wilson was both a forthrightly liberal president and
a wartime president, while Cleveland and Carter were almost defiantly
neither. Moreover, Wilson and Carter were southerners to one latitudinal
degree or another; Cleveland, though sympathetic to the old Confederacy
and the New South, was not.
Thirdly, to hear him tell it, the Reverend Carter lusted only "in the
heart"; not so Cleveland, who fathered a child out of wedlock, and Wilson,
who carried on an adulterous affair with the shadowy Mrs. Peck. And, of
course, it was Carter who managed to confine all of his presidential failures
to a single term; whereas Cleveland and Wilson took eight years to establish
their own marks for futility. Finally, Cleveland and Carter were actually
rejected by the voters; Wilson was never accorded that particular
comeuppance.
But there is one other common thread. And therein lies a tale which
goes beyond matters electoral, personal, and political and to the heart of
what is wrong with the first single volume biography of Woodrow Wilson in
better than three decades. Presidents Cleveland, Carter, and Wilson all
interpreted their meteoric ascents to power to mean that they thought they
had a direct pipeline to the American people. Each believed that he could
safely ignore the advice of professional politicians, because each had
convinced himself that he had achieved his lofty status without the
assistance of professional politicians.
To one emotional degree or another, all three operated as thought
they personally embodied the national will. Therefore, all three possessed a 
significant measure of disdain for those political mortals within their own
party whose misfortune it was to dwell beneath them. In sum, all three
inhabited the worst of all psychological worlds in that each was a 
professional politician who disliked other professional politicians as a matter
of course and who refused to see himself as a member of the species.
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August Heckscher, however, is bent upon separating Wilson from this trio
of Democrats. To him, Woodrow Wilson was a self-acknowledged and
accomplished professional politician.
Wilson, of course, spent most of his adult life away from the rough
and tumble word of politics and in the sometimes rougher—and often more
cruel—world of academia. Therefore, Heckscher properly invests nearly a 
third of this biography in the pre-presidential life of his subject. Son of a 
Presbyterian minister, young "Tommy" Wilson lived a well-travelled life in a 
number of southern parsonages before finding a home within Princeton
University.
After a false start as a lawyer, a professionally reborn Woodrow
Wilson earned a John Hopkins doctorate and set out on the path of an
academic climber, culminating v> ith his return to his beloved Princeton. For
the ensuing eighteen years Wilson taught at (1892—1902) and presided
over (1902—1910) the institution which had provided him with his
"magical" undergraduate years.
Driven to succeed by a doting mother and a demanding father,
Wilson established a name for himself as a scholar of politics long before he
became a scholar in politics. Nonetheless, the substance of his most
significant work, Congressional Goverment, was, in Heckscher's view, "not
new." By the time of its 1885 publication the decline of presidential power
was both obvious and well-documented. What set Wilson's contribution
apart was his "method and style." At base, the young professor was less a 
scholar than he was a writer. As Heckscher notes, Wilson has often been
accused of failing to investigate Congress directly "before sitting down to
describe its workings." But such critics "miss the point; the book was in
essence a work of the imagination. And the imagination was that born of the
statesman."
Shortly before his elevation to the presidency of Princeton, Wilson
confided to friend and fellow historian Frederick Jackson Turner that he had
been "born a politician." Curiously, this self-characterization was not made
with an eye toward his impending promotion, but in light of a pending
request for a leave of absence so that he might travel, think, and write his
"philosophy of politics." For Wilson, who as a young man was wont to
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distribute calling cards labeled "Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Senator from
Virgina," being a "politician" was not distinct from being a "scholar." His
immediate goal was to satisfy both ambitions by producing his magnum
opus. Instead, he was soon to embark on a more overtly political career
which would leave him no time for leisurely travel, little time for reflective
thought, and not enough time to write anything of substance.
By the spring of 1902 dissatisfaction with the six-year presidency of
Francis L. Patton had reached "crisis proportions." With faculty morale low
and academic standards in decline, the board of trustees (one of whose
members was a former President of the United States by the name of
Grover Cleveland) asked for Patton's resignation and replaced him with a 
"beloved figure within the whole Princeton community", Professor Woodrow
Wilson.
Thus ended his years as a Princeton faculty member when Woodrow
Wilson had been "as close to being a happy man as would ever be the case."
By all accounts (Heckscher's included) Wilson loved the academic life. And
with good reason: as a teacher and scholar Woodrow Wilson was a 
resounding success. That rarest of professorial birds, he was both a 
captivating lecturer and a highly regarded published historian.
Moreover, when he was not crafting either the spoken or written
word Woodrow Wilson was the compleat family man, with a wife (Ellen
Axson Wilson) whom he deeply loved and three daughters of whom he was
thoroughly and equally proud. It would seem that nothing could have
enhanced —or disturbed— this placid and productive scene. And yet Wilson
thought he could improve upon perfection by crowning his academic career,
not with a literaray masterpiece, but with the presidency of his treasured
Princeton.
For most of the next eight years the Wilson biography is not a story
of the Peter Principle in action. In fact, Heckscher judges the first half of his
tenure to have been a "time of accomplishment." With the goal of placing a 
liberal arts education "squarely at the center of Princeton's task," Wilson
moved rapidly to introduce a freshman core curriculum and to tighten all
undergraduate discipline. The centerpiece for all of his plans was the much-
heralded "preceptorial system," which placed a significant measure of
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Princeton undergraduate education in the hands of freshly minted products
of American highher education. By the fall of 1905 more than forty
"preceptors" had been recruited, leading Heckscher to conclude that "no
college faculty has ever received at one stroke so dramatic an infusion of
new blood."
But Wilson's remaining four years (not unlike the second term of his
second presidency) were far less successful. And, as would be the case in
1919, physical problems contributed to his political decline. On May 28,
1906, President Wilson awoke to find himself blind in his left eye. The loss
of vision was initially attributed to a burst blood vessel, stemming from
general hypertension; but subsequent authorities have concluded that this
was the first of a series of small strokes, all of which were precursors to his
collapse in the midst of the struggle to ratify the Versailles Treaty in the fall
of 1919.
Whatever the exact cause of his illness, the Woodrow Wilson who
presided over Princeton after the spring of 1906 displayed "not only a 
different side of his character but at critical moments (made) painful errors
of judgment". Gone too frequently was the gentle, demonstrably affectionate
Wilson. In its place was the "irascible" Wilson, who "never forgot that he
was the son of Presbyterians." Unwilling to bend, unable to admit defeat,
this Woodrow Wilson was, but his own words, "a thorough Presbyterian,"
and one who often felt, in Heckscher's words, "called to prove it." For the
remainder of his life the oscillation between these two Wilsons continued
unabated.
Other torments in Wilson's private life had begun to surface as well.
Subject to mystifying bouts of depression which had long bedeviled the
Axson family, Ellen Wilson a year earlier had suffered a shock from which
she would never fully recover. In late April of 1905 her favored younger
brother, his wife, and their two-year old son were drowned in a tragic ferry
accident. In her grief and depression Ellen Wilson abruptly abandoned her
role as Princeton's First Lady and gradually withdrew from her husband. In
his confusion and resentment Woodrow Wilson retreated to Bermuda in the
winter of 1907. There he sought rest and rejuvenation, while she remained
in Princeton, much "like the fixtures in the house."
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And there he met May Allen Hulbert Peck, once widowed, once
unhappily married, and finally a Bermuda regular for the preceding fifteen 
winters. Though the friendship long remained a platonic one, the "web of
circumstance had been woven...In Ellen's depression, in Mary Peck's
faltering spirit, in Woodrow's emotional isolation existed elements to bring
these three into a complex human relationship."
Following a second winter interlude in Bermuda, Wilson decided to
reveal the friendship to his wife and without apparent remorse promised to
extinguish what Heckscher calls this "glimpse of an intoxicating happiness."
Two months later, as was often his practice, Wilson publicly paraded his
private thoughts. In his 1908 baccalaureate address Wilson expressed a 
preference for self-denial over repentance: "I am not sure," he confided to
his undergraduates, "that it is of the first importance that you should be
happy. Many an unhappy man has been of deep service to the world and to
himself." Or so Woodrow Wilson had assumed was his own fate.
Nonetheless, Heckscher believes it to be highly probable that the
unhappy Wilson sought to retrieve his "glimpse" of happiness, specifically
that his relationship with Mrs. Peck shifted from a romantic friendship to a 
love affair sometime during 1909. Unhappiness acknowledged, he moved to
achieve personal happiness at the same time that his presidency—and his
opportunity for service?—were grinding to an ignominious end.
Ironically, this betrayal of his wife (which years later Wilson referred
to as an act of "folly and gross impertinence") came on the heels of his own
feelings of betrayal at the hands of his prized Princeton protege, Professor
John Hibben. At issue was the location of the graduate school, which Wilson
did not want physically removed from the rest of the university. In this fight 
he thought that he could count on the support of Hibben only to have his
longtime confidante and ally take the lead in opposing him. A simple
negative vote the president might have accepted: but command of the
dissidents was to Wilson an act of unforgivable treachery. A decade later,
the until-then-ubiquitous Colonel Edward House stood similarly accused
before meeting the same ostracized fate.
Curiously, Wilson was quick to see himself as the one betrayed, but
never was he willing to admit that he might himself be the betrayer. In 1915
156
he would tell the soon-to-be second Mrs. Wilson, Edith Boiling Gait, that
Ellen Wilson "knew and understood and (had) forgiven" his "folly" with
Mary Peck prior to her death from Bright's disease in August of 1914. No
more apparently needed to be—or was—said.
To Heckscher, Wilson routinely saw himself as "two different men,
the one scarcely aware of what the other was thinking." Thus, he, too, seeks
to absolve his subject of any responsibility for his behavior. If it was not a 
case of "dualism," it was simply Wilson's "New Freedom" asserting control
of his private life a few years before it would surface as a campaign slogan.
Heckscher's penchant for excusing Wilson persists in his treatment
of the gubernatorial and presidential Wilson. To Heckscher the New Jersey
governorship was not a convenient escape from defeat at Princeton, because
Wilson "simply did not see his carreer at Princeton as ending in failure."
Nor did Hecksher's Wilson take the support of the New Jersey Democratic
machine only to spurn the politicians by becoming a reform-minded
governor. Such behavior was beyond the psychological pale for this ever-
righteous son of Presbyterians.
If President Wilson was a reluctant gubernatorial candidate, then
Governor Wilson was an equally hesitant presidential aspirant. With a 
biographer's shrug, Heckscher concludes that an almost apolitical Woodrow 
Wilson was "inclined to let matters take their course." But such nonchalance
did not imply non-interest. Happy or unhappy, Woodrow Wilson was still a 
man of considerable ambition. Not that ambition ought to require a sacrifice
of principle. As early as 1911 Wilson confided to Mary Peck his worry that
the South might be too interested in his possible candidacy. In his view the
South was conservative and "I am a radical." Given his "hatred" of "false
colors," Wilson decided to go before an audience of prominent southern
leaders to set the record straight by endorsing the initiative, referendum,
and recall, which to Heckscher were then the "very symbols of radicalism in
politics."
Once again Heckscher is willing to take Wilson at his word—and to
note that his "radicalism" cost Wilson significant southern support at the
1912 Democratic convention. To Heckscher the Baltimore gathering was an
"irresistible showpiece" of American politics—and one with a "happy
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ending" as well. Not only was Wilson the nominee, but reformist pro-
gressivism was in control of the Democratic Party. Once again, Heckscher
and Wilson are one.
Having taken Wilson to the doors of the White House, Heckscher
permits the private Wilson a measure of reticence. The substance of the rest
of the Wilson story is "less the tale of what the world did to him than of
what he did to the world." Or tried to do, all in the name of something less
than unbridled Wilsonian idealism, for August Heckscher, having already
humanized the previously austere-appearing Professor Wilson, is deter-
mined to politicize the often dreamily protrayed President Wilson.
In fact, Heckscher takes pains to portray Wilson as the consummate
consensus politician. Borrowing from an earlier Wilson biographer, Charles
Seymour, Heckscher agrees that Wilson sought to "catch the trend of the
inarticulate rather than the vociferous opinion." With a leadership style
which "depended heavily on being able to interpret the national will," Wilson
invariably waited for the majority view to surface magically—or "avoid [ed]
action even when his personal views and preferences were clear."
The enactment of New Freedom legislation is a case in point. Laws
were passed to "establish conditions for full and fair competition," but
forgotten was his 1912 campaign "promise of social justice" as well. Here
Heckscher and Herbert Croly, founding father of The New Republic, are
one. To Heckscher, Wilson was all too content to leave "untouched the
social and humanitarian issues that had been an underlying part of the New
Freedom agenda." To Croly, Wilson was a conundrum: "How can a man of
his shrewd and masculine intelligence possibly delude himself into making
the extravagant clains which he makes on behalf of the Democratic
legislative achievement." Heckscher thinks that he has an answer to
"Croly's question: "Wilson's apparent belief that progressivism had been
fulfilled...was at odds with his deeper convictions." However, Wilson the
politician knew just what the traffic would bear and was quite content to
settle for it.
On the foreign policy front Wilson pursued a similar strategy, his
efforts to force Mexico to "elect good men" notwithstanding. Heckscher is
not about to dismiss entirely the idealism that was a part of Woodrow 
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Wilson's nature, but he is insistent that that idealism was almost always
tempered by political skill and historical knowledge. It is true that foreign
policy was totally ignored in Wilson's first inaugural address. It is also true
that his self-described "one track mind" focused primarily on domestic
issues during the first months of his administration. And it is finally true that
Wilson thought it would be a "supreme irony" if his presidency was
engulfed by foreign policy.
Engulfed it became, but Heckscher argues that Wilson was "not as
unprepared ... as has often been supposed." For years Professor Wilson had
examined European forms of government and had pondered the "American
march toward imperialism." For months President-elect and President
Wilson had wondered about the fate of the previous graduate of Princeton
University to occupy the White House. Woodrow Wilson, like James
Madison before him, took pride in his scholarly erudition. But President
Woodrow Wilson, unlike James Madison, was determined that he would
never be drawn into war.
After August, 1914, Heckscher pursues Wilson's pursuit of peace,
whether he was closeted in the White House with his thoughts and his
typewriter, or at large on the golf course, out for a Sunday drive, or before a 
post-Lusitania crisis audience which learned that there was "such a thing as
a man being too proud to fight." Clearly, Woodrow Wilson was not anxious
to take his country into the maelstrom that was World War I. Neither were
his countrymen anxious to be so led. To accomplish this peaceful end,
Wilson had to steer between the Allied and Central powers and among any
number of feuding advisers, from his first secretary of state, William
Jennings Bryan, who was too ready to sacrifice American interests, to his
second secretary of state, Robert Lansing, who was too determined to join
the allies on the field of battle.
Only Wilson, it seems, knew just when to urge peace, or to plot
mediation, or to press the belligerents, or to begin the process of American
mobilization. In fact, it was the "preparedness" issue that led Wilson to
depart from his presidential practice of simultaneously listening to the
people and remaining aloof from them. Until the end of 1915 and the
decision to make the case for increased defense expenditures Wilson's
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presidency had been "at least as taciturn as Cleveland's." Not so from that
point on...until his fateful collapse in the midst of the fight for the treaty and
the league.
These nearly four years of the Wilson admistration mark the slow
birth, the temporary triumph and the final defeat of Wilsonian idealism.
They also call into question Heckscher's portrait of a President Woodrow
Wilson who was instinctively reluctant to waste personal energy or invest
political capital. Gone was the Wilson who would wait for a national
consensus to emerge. But gone as well were "his more attractive qualities—
modesty and humor, courtesy under stress." Unhappily in Heckscher's view,
this "human" side of Wilson's personality was never fully revealed to the
American people. Unhappily for Wilson and those around him, it
disappeared from private view as the question of peace or war intensified.
Gone also was Wilson the conciliator. In his place stood Wilson the
oracle, Wilson the idealist, and Wilson the victim of his enemies' treachery.
Heckscher, in fact, discovers many Wilsons, but never does he come
upon a hypocritical Wilson. In 1916 Wilson ran for re-election as the peace
candidate. Even the departed Bryan "join[ed] with the American people in
thanking God that we have a president who does not want this nation
plunged into this war." Did God—or the president—deserve such thanks?
Surely not the latter, Heckscher concludes, for he did little more than "pick
up the antiwar theme of the (Democratic) convention and use it with
devastating effectiveness."
Wilson proceeded to use his victory to attempt once more to stop
what was to him an essentially European civil war in which both sides
"professed allegiance to the same ultimate goals." The Allies were angered
by Wilson's moral equation, but Heckscher is not. Whether offering
mediation or delivering his "peace without victory" speech, Wilson was a 
representative of the "noblest tradition of western liberalism" at a time of
rampant "militarism" throughout the western world.
And how did the German government respond to these overtures?
With an act of premeditated betrayal by announcing the resumption of
unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson suffered a "profound shock," but
neither he nor the American people were as yet ready for war.
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Two months would pass before Wilson took the final "tragical" step.
"Tragical" was Wilson's word, and by it he meant not just the loss of life, but
the inevitable embrace of evil means to achieve what had always been his
goal, namely the redemption of corrupt Europe. What he thought had been
obtainable by peaceful example was now to be accomplished by force of
arms.
"Tragical" might also be Heckscher's word to describe Woodrow
Wilson's public life between the spring of 1917 and the fall of 1919, "tragical"
not solely because of Wilson's debilitating stroke, but also because of his
failure to achieve his larger vision. It is Heckscher's contetion that this
failure was both preventable and lamentable.
He attributes Wilson's defeats to a series of errors in political
judgment, rather than to a flawed—or inevitably interventionist— Wilsonian
vision. Long reluctant to enter the war, Wilson also proved hesitant to
demand wartime conformity at home or to eliminate Bolshevism in Russia.
If there was hysteria on the homefront, it was beyond the president's power
to conjure up or to control. And if Leninism was at odds with Wilsonianism,
the president preferred more watchful waiting to military action, because he
wanted the Russian people to have an opportunity to work out their own
political destiny. To Wilson, Bolshevism was both an expression of Russian
national will and a "protest against the way in which the world has worked."
Wilson, of course, did ultimately sign on with the comic opera that was the
allied intervention in the Russian civil war. Heckscher, however, sees this as
a minor aberration rather than a symptom of the real Woodrow Wison at his
evil worst.
Finally, Heckscher is covinced that had Wilson not suffered his
crippling stroke there would have been no Palmer raids and no American
Red Scare. Having denied a politically powerful and apparently healthy
Woodrow Wilson responsibility for the anti-Hun excesses, Heckscher
presumes that a politically weakened but physically able Woodrow Wilson
would have blunted its anti-red counterpart.
But was Wilson as benign—or as powerful—as Heckscher suggests?
Not when the peace settlement was at stake. Heckscher regrets Wilson's
"almost inevitable" decision to go to Paris, but surmises that Wilson had an
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inkling as to what was in store for him: "As martyrs before him had gone to
their martyrdom, Woodrow Wilson went half-knowingly, not entirely
cheerless, and ready to put up a good fight." Furthermore, this martyr went
into the lion's den "an essentially modest man," uninterested in fighting 
alone and ready to make common cause with and left-liberals everywhere.
In fact, in the early stages of the conference Wilson gave no hint of playing
the martyr at all, but operated as a "model of open-minded, if determined,
rationalism."
The rational approach was already at the work in the collectivity of
the Inquiry, a stable of American experts on whom the "open-minded"
Wilson "relied heavily." ("Show me the right and I will fight for it.") Wilson
was also prepared to fall back on his well-tested skills as a persuader and
negotiator. It was almost as though the old Woodrow Wilson had been born
anew.
Far from being overcome by—or misreading the adulation of—the
European masses, Wilson understood the French need for security and
worked to form a "sincere friendship" with French Premier Georges
Clemenceau. At the same time, Wilson saw the League of Nations as a "vital
thing—not merely a formal thing." In his view the League was not to be
restricted to enforcing the treaty. And in Heckscher's view Wilson's "overall
conviction of the need for the League was certainly correct"—and not
necessarily inimical to either American or French national interests.
In fact, Wilson's self-imposed task in the first phase of the
conference was to imbed the League in the Treaty. That achieved, he
returned to the United States in early March. But any initial success that
Wilson enjoyed was not to be repeated when the conference reconvened in
April.
Why? In Wilson's occasionally paranoiac mind the fault lay with
Colonel House, who "ha(d) given away everything (Wilson) had won before
(he) left Paris." Here was Wilson betrayed yet again—and by no less than
another trusted ally whom the president loved like a brother. In truth,
Wilson's conference colleagues used the League to exact concessions,
concessions Wilson presumed would be corrected by a "vital" League. But
for the time being Wilson was at the mercy of the "extremism of French
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claims," claims which Heckscher subsequently characterized as "not
unreasonable." In any event, the French occupation of the left bank of the
Rhine and of the Saar Basin were not the result of any machination on the
part of Colonel House, but of the process of the negotiations themselves. If
anything, House could be accused of being unwilling to placate the new
Mrs. Wilson who both distrusted and despised him.
But Edith Boiling Gait Wilson was not the only member of the
Wilson household who held others in disdain in the spring of 1919. For his
part, the president despised and disdained both Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
and the entire Republican majority of the United States Senate. According to
Heckscher, such feelings left Wilson "in no mood" to address the Congress
upon his return to Washington following the pause in the Paris talks. All
bitterness aside, Heckscher argues that Wilson erred significantly in
refusing to take this "dramatic step to assert national leadership." And yet
by not asserting presidential power Wilson was really doing no more and no
less than Heckscher assures us had long been typical of this politically
successful presidency. It was Theodore Roosevelt who climbed into the
bully pulpit with little urging; Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, generally
preferred a more restrained approach, no matter his frame of mind. Besides,
hadn't Professor Wilson himself asserted in Constitutional Government of
the United States that the president ought to defer to the collective
judgment of the senate when the issue at hand was treaty ratification?
Presumably, President Wilson had forgotten what Professor Wilson
had written. Political errors or memory lapses aside, Woodrow Wilson in the
summer of 1919 was not yet a man devoured by paranoia or driven by a 
martyr complex. At least August Heckscher's Woodrow Wilson was not
such a man: "With a stubborn faith in the ultimate good sense of the people,
Woodrow Wilson managed to avoid depression or despair...(Instead) he
remained detached and integrated, hopeful but not quite fooled, either by
himself or by others."
But as of mid-1919 President Wilson was a once adept politician who
had lost a step or two. An earlier Wilson might have realized that the
American infatuation with the idea of the League of Nations had cooled. An
earlier Wilson would surely have come to terms with the force and depth of
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the "partisan passions" arrayed against him. And an earlier Woodrow
Wilson, the "shrewd and practical" Woodrow Wilson, no doubt would have
forged a working coalition to secure ratification of the treaty in some
acceptable form. But the Woodrow Wilson of the summer of 1919 was a 
"depleted man." It was this Wilson who made one of the "most fateful
decisions" of his political career, and a decision which Heckscher argues
was out of character for him, namely the decision to take his case for the
Treaty and the League directly to the American people.
According to Heckscher, Wilson's "nature" as a political leader was
to stand on principle, but to "take circumstances into due account" when
applying his principles to political reality. As Lodge added reservation upon
reservation Wilson had to have been aware that the Treaty would not pass
the Senate without some changes. Instead of accepting—and modifying—
the Lodge agenda, Wilson refused to "take circumstances into due account."
Instead of dealing with the Senate he took to the hustings. The result was
political defeat and a personal breakdown. "I don't seem to realize it," the
president told his White House physician, "but I seem to have gone to
pieces." That much at least he did come to realize. The loss of the treaty,
however, he refused to accept.
Isolated in battle, Woodrow Wilson grew even more remote in the
remaining months of his suddenly depleted presidency. Like Cleveland
before him and Carter after him, Wilson left the White House a politically
broken man. Though it was not necessarily his intention to do so,
Heckscher has tried valiantly to separate his subject from the failures of
these two Democrats, who also rose to the presidency almost without
warning, who also preferred to stand apart from their party at critical
junctures, and who met failure in Washington partly because of their refusal
to play Washingtonian games.
For better or for worse, Woodrow Wilson was an oracle—and an
idealist—before he was a politician. Heckscher would have it the other way
around, but to minimize his idealism is to deny the reality of the man.
Wilson himself said it best during his fight to keep the United States out of
World War I: "I know I am an idealist, because I am an American and
America is the only idealistic nation in the world."
164
In a sence, August Heckscher has written a biography of Woodrow
Wilson that is very much in keeping with America's diminished view of itself
at the end of the twentieth century. The Cold War has ended and much of
the world seems to be asking to be made safe for democracy. And yet
America shrinks from its historic role. Providential is the opportunity, but
prudential is the operative word.
It may be ironic—or more likely just a quirk of history—that George
Bush was born the year that Woodrow Wilson died. A product of the Good
War and the American Century, Bush's political life and professional resume
have been ample preparation for a Wilsonian presidency. Every interna-
tionlist gene in his body ought to command this president in the direction of
a rejuvenated Wilsonianism. Instead, we have the New World Order which
places a premium on stability and leader-to-leader confidentiality. As Wilson
apparently sympathized with the security needs of France, so Bush claims to
understand the very different security needs of the current Chinese
gerontocracy.
Nowhere in the George Bush order of things is there room for
leadership on the order of a Woodrow Wilson before August Heckscher got
hold of him. To be blunt, Heckscher has given us Woodrow Wilson as a 
considerably more articulate and slighly more principled George Bush,
instead of the Woodrow Wilson who was never bedeviled by the charge that
he lacked a "vision thing."
The first Democratic president since Grover Cleveland may have
been a blip on the political screen of Republican dominance in the White
House, but he caused a mighty stir during his eight years in power. George
Bush has had a stir fall into his lap, but he seems to have little clue as to
what to do with it. The president as steward, he seems to want four more
years in office.
Near the end of his second term Woodrow Wilson canvassed the
country to preach to Americans that the time had come to join the
community of nations. Throughout his presidency George Bush has circled
and re-circled the globe in search of his elusive stability and, oh yes, in
search of "jobs, jobs, and jobs" for Americans. The former believed that
America had something to offer the world; the latter behaves as though the
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world owes Americans a living. For George Bush, this may be a politically
prudent course to follow, but it is not exactly what Woodrow Wilson had in
mind.
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